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				Pl 
				 Hurst (Appellants), who appealed. [40 acre track]. 
				
				Df 
				 Baker (Appellees), who won last time. [54 acres track] 
				
				Description 
				o        
				
				
				This case involves a dispute over a roadway by contiguous 
				property owners.  
				o        
				
				
				Both the roadway, and the properties appurtenant were originally 
				part of a much greater tract of land acquired by a common title 
				holder more than eighty (80) years ago. 
				o        
				
				
				Approximately ninety-four (94) acres of real estate which 
				referred to as the master tract) were conveyed to John and 
				Effie Lowks. 
				
				Conveyed Land to Son (William) 
				o        
				
				
				Lowks split off a portion of the master tract and conveyed it to 
				William A. Lowks.  
				o        
				
				
				The deed for this property was forty (40) acre tract) 
				 
				
				William died without will 
				o        
				
				
				His heirs sold land to Haynes. 
				o        
				
				
				Same legal tree description. 
				
				Haynes 
				o        
				
				
				Sold land to Burton. 
				o        
				
				
				Different legal description. 
				o        
				
				
				The deed also provided that the grantees (Mr. and Mrs. Burton) 
				would receive an open 
				roadway in common, twenty 
				feet wide, extending westerly 
				across the land formerly owned by Lowks, now owned by 
				Baker, extending to the county road 
				known as Lowks road. 
				
				Roadway in Common 
				o        
				
				
				Was continued in all further conveyances. 
				o        
				
				
				Including 
				the acquisition of the 40 acre track 
				by the appellants. 
				
				Appellees 
				o        
				
				
				Also acquire their property through mesne conveyances from the 
				original master track. 
				o        
				
				
				The 54 acre remainder was conveyed to Perry and Cora Lork. 
				o        
				
				
				Same legal description was used except for the forty acre track 
				and the road. 
				
				Baker 
				o        
				
				
				The identify description was used 18 years later when conveyed 
				to Ernest Baker. 
				o        
				
				
				Baker sold land with new legal description. 
				o        
				
				
				The deed further provided that a 
				roadway 20 feet in width running through the 
				property was excepted from the 
				conveyance.  
				o        
				
				
				This sort of description was thereafter used in all instruments 
				affecting title to the fifty-four (54) acre tract up to, and 
				including, the most recent transfer in 1994. | 
				
				Appellants Commenced Action (Fee Simple Arg) 
				o   
				
				
				Appellants commenced the action below on April 7, 1995, 
				asserting that they were the owners of the 
				fee simple interest in the 
				roadway specified in their chain of title to the forty (40) acre 
				tract.  
				o   
				
				
				They sought to have that interest quieted against any claim of 
				interest by the owners of the fifty-four (54) acre tract. 
				 
				  
				
				Appellees  Easement (Easement Arg) 
				o   
				
				
				Appellees filed an answer denying that appellants owned a fee 
				simple interest in the disputed roadway. It was asserted by 
				appellees that the road through their property was merely 
				an easement ... to be used in common by the owners 
				of both tracts. 
				  
				
				Bench Court 
				o   
				
				
				The bench trial concluded with both parties stipulating that 
				they, and their predecessors in title, had 
				all made continual use of 
				the road at issue herein. 
				o   
				
				
				Awarded appellees the fee simple owners of the roadway. 
				  
				
				Bench Court Concerns 
				o   
				
				
				At first the conveyance looked like it was made in fee. 
				o   
				
				
				However, the authority of a grantor to erect fences and gates 
				around a roadway was more consistent with the grant of an 
				easement.  
				o   
				
				A 
				deed purporting to convey a road or roadway is usually 
				construed as passing an easement. 
				o   
				
				
				The court found it unlikely that John and Effie Lowks would 
				convey a fee interest in the roadway through the remainder of 
				their property to the back forty (40) acre tract.  
				o   
				
				
				Such action would have, effectively, cut the remaining 
				fifty-four (54) acres into two (2) separate parcels. 
				  
				
				Second hearing 
				o   
				
				
				To determine the nature of the easement and the parties rights 
				and responsibilities with respect to each other's interest(s).
				 
				o   
				
				
				The trial court entered judgment finding that the easement was non-exclusive 
				and could be used in common 
				by both parties.  
				o   
				
				
				Appellants were adjudged to have the responsibility for 
				maintaining the roadway in good repair and appellees were 
				instructed that they could not farm the fifty-four (54) acre 
				tract (i.e. the servient estate) in any manner which could 
				interfere with ingress/egress to the back forty (40) acre tract.
				 
				o   
				
				A 
				survey giving a precise location and metes and bounds 
				description of the easement was later approved by the trial 
				court.  
				o   
				
				
				This appeal followed. 
				  
				
				Appellate Court 
				o   
				
				
				Construction of a deed is a matter of law. 
				o   
				
				
				The standard of review is de novo. 
				o   
				
				
				The appellant court will conduct their own standard of review. 
				  
				
				Appellants Argue 
				o   
				
				
				The lower court erroneously ruled in favor of appellees and that 
				they are, in fact, the fee simple owners of the disputed 
				roadway.  
				
				Appellate Court 
				o   
				
				
				We agree.  
				o   
				
				
				The outcome of this case is governed by the original deed from 
				John and Effie Lowks to William A. Lowks in 1912. 
				  
				
				Appellate  Court 
				- Roadway was conveyed in Fee Simple 
				o   
				
				
				Our analysis begins with the well settled principle that it is 
				the intent of the parties to this instrument which will control 
				its interpretation.  
				o   
				
				
				If that intention is clear from the language of the deed, then 
				it will be given effect regardless of technical rules of 
				construction.  
				o   
				
				
				We find that the language of this deed is sufficiently clear to 
				determine that a fee interest to the disputed roadway was 
				conveyed to William A. Lowks and continued in the chain of title 
				to the forty (40) acre tract down to appellants. 
				  
				
				Legal Description Analysis 
				o   
				
				
				The road was also included in the grant. 
				o   
				
				
				The word also means in addition or likewise. 
				o   
				
				
				Mean it is equal in weight to what precedes it. 
				  
				
				Logically Follows 
				
				o   
				
				
				Given that the grant of such forty (40) acres was in fee simple, 
				it logically follows that the grant of the road was also in fee 
				simple.  
				  
				
				Never used terms 
				o   
				
				
				The grantors never once made use of 
				any terms such as easement or right-of-way 
				which would have clearly indicated that only a means of 
				ingress/egress was being transferred. 
				  
				
				keep both sides of said road fenced with no gates 
				o   
				
				
				This is in the deed simply to ensure that the grantee has 
				unimpeded access back along the road to the forty (40) acre 
				tract.  
				o   
				
				
				This would be of concern to the owner of that tract irrespective 
				of whether he owned the road in fee or merely had an easement to 
				use it. 
				  
				
				Rule 
				o   
				
				
				Deeds must be construed most strongly in favor of the grantee, 
				and against the grantor, in order to derogate [detract] as 
				little as possible from the extent of the grant. 
				o   
				
				
				To pass the roadway as an easement would derogate the grant. 
				  
				
				Rule 
				o   
				
				
				Deeds must be construed as conveying the grantor's entire 
				interest in the land described therein 
				unless a clear 
				limitation is placed. 
				o   
				
				A 
				fee interest is obviously a greater estate than an easement.
				 
				  
				
				Rule 
				o   
				
				
				In the absence of language relating to the use or purpose of the 
				grant, or language limiting the estate conveyed, a transfer of a 
				strip of land is generally construed as passing an estate in 
				fee. 
				  
				  
				
				Appellate  Court 
				 two separate parcels 
				o   
				
				
				There was no legal impediment to conveying a fee simple on the 
				road way. 
				o   
				
				
				The court recognizes that it would be unusual. 
				  
				
				Holding 
				o   
				
				
				Trial Court is in error.  Reversed and remanded showing the 
				appellants are the fee simple owners of the roadway. 
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